TitleWhat anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer
AuthorsYe, Feng
AffiliationPeking Univ, Dept Philosophy, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China.
Cent Univ Finance & Econ, China Inst Adv Study, Beijing, Peoples R China.
KeywordsPhilosophy of mathematics
Anti-realism
Realism
Naturalism
INDISPENSABILITY
Issue Date2010
Publishersynthese
CitationSYNTHESE.2010,175,(1),13-31.
AbstractThis article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/243730
ISSN0039-7857
DOI10.1007/s11229-009-9535-7
IndexedA&HCI
SCI(E)
SSCI
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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