Title试析早期谢林与费希特的“绝对自我”观的差异
Other TitlesDifferences between early Schelling's and Fichte's views of “absolute I”
Authors先刚
Affiliation北京大学
Keywords绝对自我
经验意识
事实
无条件者
absolute I
empirical consciousness
facts
unconditional
Issue Date2019
Publisher云南大学学报(社会科学版)
Abstract学界通常认为,费希特和谢林(在前者的影响下)都是在其哲学的起步阶段就建立了一种关于"绝对自我"的学说。本文试图表明,费希特在《全部知识学的基础》中从"经验意识的事实"出发,并没有真正建立绝对自我;反之,谢林的原创性体现在,他从一开始就依据概念分析而确立了自我的绝对者地位,从而真正第一次建立起关于"绝对自我"的学说。
It is generally believed that both Fichte and Schelling( under the influence of the former) established a theory of"absolute I"at the beginning stage of their philosophy. This paper attempts to show that Fichte in his"The Foundation of All Wissenschaftslehre",based on"the facts of empirical consciousness",did not really establish an"absolute I". On the contrary,Schelling's originality lies in the fact that he from the beginning and on the basis of conceptual analysis established the"I"as an absolute subject,and thus established the theory of"absolute self"for the first time.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/564896
ISSN1671-7511
Indexed中文核心期刊要目总览(PKU)
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