TitleTrue lies
AuthorsAgotnes, Thomas
van Ditmarsch, Hans
Wang, Yanjing
AffiliationUniv Bergen, Informat Sci & Media Studies, Bergen, Norway.
Zhejiang Univ, Ctr Study Language & Cognit, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China.
Univ Lorraine, CNRS, LORIA, Nancy, France.
Peking Univ, Dept Philosophy, Beijing, Peoples R China.
Issue Date2018
CitationSYNTHESE. 2018, 195(10,SI), 4581-4615.
AbstractA true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy's logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts.
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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