TitleAristotle and Eudoxus on the Argument from Contraries
AuthorsCheng, Wei
AffiliationPeking Univ, Inst Foreign Philosophy, Dept Philosophy, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
KeywordsSOCIAL PAIN
PLEASURE
REPRESENTATIONS
Issue DateDec-2020
PublisherARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE
AbstractThe debate over the value of pleasure among Eudoxus, Speusippus, and Aristotle is dramatically documented by the Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in the dialectical pros-and-cons concerning the so-called argument from contraries. Two similar versions of this argument are preserved at EN VII. 13, 1153b14, and X. 2, 1172b1820. Many scholars believe that the argument at EN VII is either a report or an appropriation of the Eudoxean argument in EN X. This essay aims to revise this received view. It will explain why these two arguments differ in premises, contents and purposes, and why these distinctions matter for a proper assessment of Aristotles understanding of pleasure and pain in general and his dialectical art in particular.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/601887
ISSN0003-9101
DOI10.1515/agph-2017-0035
IndexedA&HCI
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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