TitleA Case for Modal Fragmentalism
AuthorsZhan, Yiwen
AffiliationPeking Univ, Dept Philosophy, Beijing, Peoples R China
Issue DateNov-2020
PublisherPHILOSOPHIA
AbstractThe idea of fragmentalism has been proposed by Kit Fine as a non-standard view of tense realism. This paper examines a modal version of the view, called modal fragmentalism, which combines genuine realism and realism of modality. Modal fragmentalism has been recently discussed by Iaquinto. But unlike Iaquinto, who primarily focused on possibilities de re, in this paper, we focus on expressions of possibilities de dicto. We argue that the chief idea of modal realism should be that different worlds are distinguished not just in terms of how things are differently with respect to each world, but also in terms of how things could have been differently with respect to each world. This demands a realism-oriented semantics for suppositional contents, and more specifically, for conditionals. By deploying a multidimensional semantics for conditionals, we show that there are good reasons to consider modal fragmentalism as a serious approach in metaphysics, which shares many similarities with the fragmentalism of tense.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/608044
ISSN0048-3893
DOI10.1007/s11406-020-00284-5
IndexedA&HCI
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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