TitleNo Case Against Disjunctive Properties
AuthorsZhao, Xinkan
AffiliationPeking Univ, Dept Philosophy, Beijing, Peoples R China
Peking Univ, Inst Foreign Philosophy, Old Chem Bldg,5 Yihe Yuan Rd, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
Issue DateJun-2021
AbstractMeinertsen has recently put forward three arguments against disjunctive properties: the arguments from truthmaking, commonality, and causation. In this paper, I argue that all three arguments fail. The argument from truthmaking rests on the problematic notion of different types of truthmakers and is therefore itself problematic. The argument from commonality may hold but only at the cost of losing much of the philosophical significance of its conclusion. The argument from causation essentially collapses into the argument from truthmaking and is therefore problematic for the same reason as the latter is. I conclude that Meinertsen has not made a case against disjunctive properties.
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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