TitleDoxastic justification through dispositions to cause
AuthorsSchonherr, Julius
AffiliationPeking Univ, Inst Foreign Philosophy, Dept Philosophy & Religious Studies, 5 Yiheyuan Rd, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
KeywordsREASONS
Issue Date21-Jul-2022
PublisherSYNTHESE
AbstractAccording to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified-i.e., permissibly held-only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason's mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn't establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason's causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11897/649468
ISSN0039-7857
DOI10.1007/s11229-022-03800-0
IndexedA&HCI
SCI(E)
SSCI
Appears in Collections:哲学系(宗教学系)

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